While the term
'androgynous' may appear to undermine gender dualism -- which is predicated on
gender essentialism -- on initial inspection, its truly neutral sense proves
impossible in a patriarchal context. As Simone de Beauvoir argues in her
introduction to The Second Sex (1949):
'man represents both the positive and the neutral, as is indicated by the
common use of man to designate human
beings in general; whereas woman represents only the negative, defined by
limiting criteria, without reciprocity.' Furthermore, its implications in those
individuals largely perceived as men (so clumsily termed because 'androgynous'
has such a capacity to question our perceptions of other people's genders) are
to effeminate attributes - a word which seems to carry exceedingly negative
connotations.
To see the use of
this word in Virginia Woolf's 'A Room of One's Own' however was rather
exciting. Perhaps she could reclaim it for all its deviating qualities! She
starts by questioning mental disparities between individuals of different
sexes: 'Why do I feel that there are severances and oppositions in the mind, as
there are strains from obvious causes on the body?' (p.92) Why indeed. Then,
introducing this notion of unity that the term 'androgyny' would imply, she
further questions, 'But the sight of two people getting into the taxi and the
satisfaction it gave me made me also ask whether there are two sexes in the
mind corresponding to the two sexes in the body, and whether they also require
to be united in order to get complete satisfaction and happiness?' (p.93).
While I dispute the dualism of this suggestion, and that they correspond necessarily to the sex of each individual,
Woolf also appears to suggest that all individuals have access to a wider range
of mental attributes than merely those that are assigned to one's gender.
Unfortunately, Woolf
then begins to reinforce gender essentialism with the notion of how one
gendered mind predominates over the
other to parallel whether that person is a man or a woman: 'In each of us two
powers preside, one male, one female; and in the man's brain the man
predominates over the woman, and in the woman's brain the woman predominates
over the man' (pp.93-4). Considering that androgyny denotes
"hermaphroditism" - or intersex people - their fit into this now
reinforced binary is disregarded.
She continues this
vein of thought in suggesting a unity in the opinions of each gender: 'Do what
she will a woman cannot find in [supposedly "masculine" books written
by men] that fountain of perpetual life which the critics assure her is there.
It is not only that they celebrate male virtues, enforce male values and
describe the world of men; it is that the emotion with which these books are
permeated is to a woman incomprehensible. […] The emotion which is so deep, so
subtle, so symbolical to a man moves a woman to wonder' (p.97). This suggests
that women all feel the same about writing which celebrates male virtues,
enforce male values and describe the world of men. Woolf does not clarify what
these supposedly gendered virtues and values are and I confess I know not a
virtue or value that is specific to men. There is apparently an essential
incapacity for one gender to understand an emotion of another gender, if it
pertains to only the "masculine" mind or the "feminine"
mind.
Woolf returns to
suggest of writing without one's gender: 'It is fatal for anyone who writes to
think of their sex. It is fatal to be a man or woman pure and simple; one must
be woman-manly or man-womanly. […] It is fatal for a woman […] in any way to speak
consciously as a woman' (p.99). Perhaps my distrust of gender essentialism
would suggest me to be empathetic with this idea, but I am not. I do not deny
commonality in gender, but find this most perceptible in the experience of individuals of the same
gender, not in essentially inherent characteristics. That is to say, to refer
to Alex Zwerdling's article, 'Anger and Conciliation in Woolf's Feminism', that
the 'subjection of women' against which Woolf rightly holds considerable anger,
is common to womankind. So, if one is not to speak consciously as a woman, but
rather as neutral with an androgynous mind, one does disservice to the
unexplored capacity of female writing. To apply my own questioning of strangely
gendered terms such as "female writing", what is that if we are
denying gender essentialism? Hélène Cixous' theory of écriture féminine is problematic in its own gender essentialism
by suggesting that a feminine form of writing should write out of, and to the
rhythms of, a female body. Susan Billingham however has suggested of the
capacity to adapt Cixous' theory to transwomen and one could go further to
expand the notion to other marginalised genders, because thereby one can write
out of the shared experience of gender-based oppression. To adopt a neutral
voice when one is starved of a voice will do nothing to quench that need, but
to return to Simone de Beauvoir's claim, the neutral is absorbed back into the
dominance of men.
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